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ABSTRACT 
We develop a campaign model for counterinsurgency that is 
derived from the Lanchester-inspired Vidale-Wolfe marketing 
model utilized in the analysis of a consumer population’s 
dynamics.  We adapt this approach for a situation in which 
the output of our differential equation model is not 
attrition but the percentage of a given population that 
supports a particular side in the insurgency. The model is 
descriptive, providing a structured framework to analyze 
complex inputs in a simple, straightforward and easily 
understood framework.  Parametric observations reveal that a 
fledgling insurgency will grow to be a major concern if left 
unaddressed by the government.  Data from Colombia’s 
insurgency demonstrates that the model is well suited to 
reflect the movement of a population’s support away from the 
government and toward an insurgency. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Counterinsurgency is a concept that the United States has 
become increasingly familiar with throughout the conflicts 
in Iraq and Afghanistan.  As the level of understanding on 
the battle field has risen, so have efforts of analysts 
within the analytic community to describe and model 
counterinsurgency.  The difficulty for the analyst is that 
the population that is the focus of counterinsurgency is an 
extraordinarily complex entity to model. 
Our approach attempts to analyze the population at the 
heart of a counterinsurgency using a simple model derived 
from Lanchester equations and the Vidale-Wolfe marketing 
model.  The output of the model is a change in a 
population’s support over time for one of two competitors, 
the insurgent or the counterinsurgent.   
We identify parametric results showing that a small 
fledgling insurgency left undisrupted by the government will 
grow over time to a point of major concern for the 
government. Utilizing existing data from the Colombian 
insurgency, we test our model and find that (1) it fits the 
data well and (2) it is well suited to demonstrate the 
movement of a population away from supporting the government 
and toward supporting an insurgency.  
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IW is a complex, “messy,” and ambiguous social 
phenomenon that does not lend itself to clean, 
neat, concise, or precise definition. 
—Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (2007) 
A. BACKGROUND 
Contemporary military conflict throughout the world is 
largely characterized by conventional military forces 
combating nonstate actors.  These groups take the form of 
terrorist organizations, criminal gangs, or insurgent 
forces.  Conflict of this nature is collectively referred to 
as Irregular Warfare, and it is a struggle that is as old as 
warfare itself.  Despite the abundance of historical 
examples of Irregular Warfare, traditional military forces 
have unquestionably struggled throughout operations aimed at 
combating “irregular” threats.  In both Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the United States has failed to prevent or 
subsequently quell insurgent growth.  In large part, the 
failure at the strategic level of leadership rests on an 
inability to recognize the trajectory of an Irregular 
Warfare insurgency.  Developing a descriptive model that 
affords strategically predictive insights may help to better 
operate in the environment the United States finds itself in 
today and in the future. 
At the heart of the difficulties senior leadership has 
with Irregular Warfare is an inability to assess, prior to 
the start of operations, what impact the conflict may have 
on the population within an area of interest.  A usual 
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source for trusted advice is the analytic community within 
the military, who is accustomed to providing recommendations 
based on objective, quantitative analysis.  In many warfare 
areas, analysts are able to investigate and model processes, 
weapon systems, parameters, and physical systems in order to 
estimate their possible impact on an enemy.  These models 
and computer simulations generate insight from which 
decision makers can evaluate courses of action in order to 
make better decisions, given the information at hand.  
Irregular Warfare is fundamentally different from these 
traditional arenas of warfare. 
At its core, Irregular Warfare is a struggle between an 
insurgent group and a “traditional” force for control over a 
population (FM 3-24, 2006).  As the Irregular Warfare Joint 
Operating Concept (IW JOC) depicts in Figure 1, the focus of 
effort in an irregular conflict moves away from military 
forces towards relevant populations that need to be 
influenced or persuaded to support the government forces.     
 
Figure 1.   From IW JOC Contrasting Conventional and Irregular 
Warfare 
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Battles in the irregular environment are not solely 
focused on killing the enemy and taking land. Soldiers do 
not assault a beach, tanks do not face tanks, and fighter 
aircraft are not dueling in the skies.   “Irregular” battles 
are series of interactions, both aggressive and violent, but 
also peaceful, diplomatic, and humanitarian. From the 
perspective of the conventional force, every battle must 
endeavor to influence the vulnerable population toward 
accepting a benign and stable interaction with a legitimate 
government.  By contrast, the irregular force intends “to 
isolate their adversaries from the relevant populations and 
their external supporters, physically as well as 
psychologically, to bolster their own legitimacy and 
credibility to exercise authority over that same population” 
(IW JOC, 2007).  Modeling, simulating, and making 
predictions about these human interactions is hard, and the 
analytic community within the military has struggled to 
generate predictive insight.  “Irregular warfare is a vast, 
amorphous concept seething with human psychology and mob 
behavior.  It encompasses politics, economics, psychology, 
sociology, and most anything else you can think of” (Peck, 
2009).   
Despite the difficulties Irregular Warfare presents, 
the analytic community must not lose sight of the fact that 
Irregular Warfare, like its conventional counterpart, is 
still a struggle between dueling adversaries.  The struggle 
for legitimacy in the eyes of the population underlying 
Irregular Warfare can be viewed as each adversary entering a 
marketplace. Each side offers its product, and begins vying 
against the competitor for a controlling stake of the market 
share, the population’s support in a counterinsurgency.  The 
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goal of this thesis is to introduce a modeling tool, 
anchored in the rich literature of marketing analysis, where 
counterinsurgency is described and understood in terms of 
population influence and control, not attrition. 
In Chapter II, we examine some current efforts to model 
Irregular Warfare and demonstrate the applicability of 
simple marketing models to gaining insight into a 
counterinsurgency campaign.  Chapter III describes the 
adapted marketing model and the parameters that define the 
counterinsurgency campaign.  We then solve the differential 
equation to obtain a steady state value in Chapter IV, as 
well as examining parametric observations utilizing 
difference equations of the model.  Chapter V makes 
conclusions from this work and offers some opportunities for 























II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND MODELING BACKGROUND 
In Chapter II, we explore some efforts to model the 
counterinsurgency environment and lay the foundation for our 
modeling methodology.  By understanding the difficulties in 
current modeling efforts and recognizing the benefits of 
aggregated models, the value and insight of our simple 
mathematical model is made evident.   
A. SYSTEM DYNAMIC MODELING 
At first glance, the complexities of the Irregular 
Warfare environment are overwhelming.  Interaction between 
foreign military forces, indigenous forces, civilians, and 
insurgents is difficult to account for and describe.  That 
difficulty makes modeling the interactions daunting for the 
analytic community attempting to provide insight to decision 
makers.   
One analysis approach that has been used within the 
Department of Defense is system dynamic modeling.  “System 
dynamics modeling provides a means of representing the key 
performance drivers, and their interdependencies and 
interactions, within dynamically complex businesses and 
environments.” (Mayo & Wichmann, 2003)  In 2005, a team from 
the J8 Warfighting Analysis Division developed a System 
Dynamic model to represent the elements of Counterinsurgency 
in FM 3-24, the Field Manual being authored at that time by 
General David Patraeus and General James Mattis.  The team 
built the layers of the System Dynamic model by stepping 




people: supporters of the host nation government, neutrals, 
and supporters of the insurgency.  The model is depicted in 
Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2.   The Hairball that Stabilized Iraq (From Pierson) 
In a contrasting effort, the United States Marine Corps 
Combat Development Command, Operations Analysis Division 
(MCCDC OAD) commissioned a study by Old Dominion University 
and the Virginia Modeling, Analysis and Simulation Center 
(VMASC) to provide insight into the Irregular Warfare 
environment.  The study attempted to quantify several 
aspects of an insurgent environment and apply those values 
in a system dynamic model, ultimately asserting “that this  
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methodology could be used to analyze contemplated policy 
changes and their temporal affect on insurgency strength.” 
(Sokolowski et al., 2007) 
Like the J8 model, the VMASC model, shown in Figure 3, 
focused on the impact of events on three populations, when 
the three were defined as: the Susceptible Population, the 































Figure 3.   From VMASC Population Dynamic Model 
In both system dynamic models discussed above, the 
foundation was a population that was defined by affiliation 
with the host government or the insurgent forces.  Success 
for either side hinged on the ability to increase its own 
population by fighting to gain legitimacy within the nation.  
The outside factors that act upon these populations are the 
driving forces causing flows between populations.  Although 
these models are competent representations that display 
logical connections, utilizing them for predictive insight 
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appears dubious.  Some of the parameters such as 
“Recruitment Factor” or “Insurgent Creation Rate” are 
greatly impacting flows but have little prospect of being 
populated with reliable numbers.  For notional predictive 
capability, the representation of so many uncertain factors 
within the undoubtedly complex environment detracts from 
rather than bolsters credibility.  Instead, we model the 
core of the problem with fewer essential parameters informed 
by the complex connections but reduced to their simplest 
dynamic representation of the system.  To do so, we start 
with another simple representation of essential elements, 
this one of combat dynamics. 
B. LANCHESTER EQUATIONS 
1. Aimed Fire 
Analysis of warfare utilizing mathematical models dates 
from 1914 with the ground-breaking work of Frederick 
Lanchester.  His development of two sets of differential 
equations to describe combat has become the foundation on 
which the majority of ground combat for aggregated models 
rests.  Lanchester modeled what he called “modern” combat, 
where both forces had the ability to aim and fire at many 
targets. He contrasted this with ancient warfare, described 
as sequential duels and later adapted as an “area fire” 
model (Taylor, 1980). 
Lanchester modeled Modern Warfare as two forces, x and 
y, where both forces would decay at a rate proportional to 
the individual effectiveness of an enemy soldier. The size 
of the x force would decay according to the a term below, 
multiplied by the number of y soldiers. Likewise, the y 
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force size would decay according the individual 
effectiveness of x soldiers, b, multiplied by the number of 






= −  
 
The relationship is most easily conceptualized in 
Figure 4, where attrition rate a and force y act on force x, 
and rate b and force x act on force y. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Lanchester's Model 
2. Area Fire 
The modern area fire representation is modeled as a 
function of the number of enemy forces “available” to be 
killed, multiplied by the forces shooting into the area and 
their effectiveness per shot fired. In short, the more of 









= −  
 
In both the Aimed Fire (Square Law) and Area Fire 
(Linear Law) equations, the measure of performance is the 
rate at which one shooter can kill or wound another.  This 
single value represents the collective combat capability of 
a force, spread across the number of soldiers engaged in 
battle.  The measure of individual capability is an input to 
the model that is necessarily derived from the input of many 
expert considerations, including battlefield data and 
instrumented experiments not derived from the model itself.   
These aggregated assumptions are made in order to 
reduce something as complex as battles between two opposing 
forces to some values and relationships that can be 
understood. It was with such simplifying assumptions, that 
Lancester demonstrated the advantage of numbers 
quantitatively, and the benefits of force concentration 
(Howell, 2007).   
Even though combat between two military forces is 
a complex random process, such deterministic 
combat models are commonly used for computational 
reasons in defense-planning studies. (Taylor, 
1980) 
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C. IRREGULAR WARFARE MODELS 
1. Deitchman Model 
The Square and Linear Law equations provide analysts 
and decision makers with valuable insights about 
conventional force on force engagements, but they offer 
little toward an understanding of conflict in the Irregular 
Warfare sense.  
In 1962, S.J. Deitchman attempted to extend 
Lanchester’s equations to a situation where guerilla forces 
would ambush a traditional force.  Deitchman modeled the 
ambushing guerilla force attriting the traditional force 
with aimed fire while the traditional force was only able to 
use unaimed area fire to shoot back at the ambushing 
guerillas (Taylor, 1980).  The model was successful in 
demonstrating that the ambushed force will have a low 
probability of hitting the concealed ambushing forces, while 
the guerilla force will have a high probability of hitting 
the forces being ambushed.    
2. Kress-Szechtman Model 
A recent paper by Moshe Kress and Roberto Szechtman of 
the Naval Postgraduate School extends the work of Lanchester 
and Deitchman to model an insurgency (Kress and Szechtman, 
2009).  Their work models a conflict between a government 
force and an insurgent force where the intelligence 
information available to the government drives the attrition 
suffered by the insurgent force, given by the following 
equation.   
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If the intelligence is perfect, μ = 1, the insurgency 
will suffer attrition according to Lanchester’s aimed fire 
model.  At the other extreme, (μ = 0) the insurgency will 
suffer attrition that is identical to Lanchester’s linear 
law.  The intelligence parameter also indirectly affects the 
ability of the insurgency to attract new recruits.  
Recruitment is modeled as resulting from government attacks 
that mistakenly hit the populous, not the insurgents.  The 
likelihood is that attack is affected by inadequate 
intelligence, μ.  The full model is depicted in Figure 5.  
Insurgents (I) attrite the government (G) according to an 
aimed fire Lanchester Model.  The government is being 
reinforced (β) while combating the insurgency with the 
intelligence driven model described earlier.  The government 
campaign against the insurgency causes collateral damage to 
the population, resulting in additional recruits for the 
insurgency.  The model has the disadvantage that its measure 
of effectiveness is casualties, with insurgent recruits 




Figure 5.   Kress-Szechtman Model 
D. MARKETING MODELS 
Understanding Lanchester’s equations and extensions of 
that work along with appreciating the assumptions, modeling 
considerations and insight they provide, has inspired the 
development of models with analogous structure for business 
purposes. Such models serve as the foundation of a model of 
marketing analysis.  In marketing, firms are competing for 
market share, not killing each other, yet this “flexible 
class of competitive marketing models. . . have a strong 
resemblance to Lanchester’s models of warfare.” (Little, 
1979) 
Mathematical modeling of marketing and advertising 
strategies and relationships is a rich area of research in 
the Operations Research community.  Analysts in the field of 
study have “developed mathematical models for many purposes, 
including better forecasting, integration of data, and 
understanding markets.” (Shugan, 2002)  It is these 
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objectives in marketing research that inspire parallels with 
Irregular Warfare and counterinsurgency.  Understanding the 
“marketplace” within which forces operate and making 
predictions about that market is vital to improving the 
means of mission accomplishment.  In business, it is 
increasing market share.  In counterinsurgency, it is 
inducing the local population to change sides. 
Our first example of marketing models is the Vidale–
Wolfe model, given by: 
( ) ( )(1 ( )) ( )dx t u t x t x t
dt
ρ δ= − −  
where x(t) is the fraction of the total market share at time 
t, u(t) is the amount of advertising expenditure or effort, 
ρ is the response constant measuring the rate of 
effectiveness per unit of effort, and δ is the rate at which 
the market share decays over time due to a diminished 
interest in, and response to, advertising. (Prasad and 
Sethi, 2004) “Vidale and Wolfe argued that changes in the 
rate of sales of a product depend on two effects: response 
to the advertising that acts on the unsold portion of the  
market and loss due to forgetting that acts on the sold 
portion of the market.” (Prasad & Sethi, 2004) 
Extending Vidale-Wolfe model to the more relevant and 
realistic case where competition exists and two competing 
firms are both vying for market share, we have: 
1
1 1 1 2 2 1
2
2 2 2 1 1 2
( ) ( )(1 ( )) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )(1 ( )) ( ) ( )
dx t u t x t u t x t
dt








Now for each firm i=1,2, ( )ix t is the fraction of the total 
market at time t, ( )iu t  is the amount of advertising 
expenditure at some level of effectiveness in winning new 
customers, and ρi a response constant.  The major change in 
the model from the original Vidale-Wolfe model is that the 
rate at which the market share decays over time is 
represented by the competitor’s efforts to make inroads into 
his adversary’s market share. We no longer have a decay over 
time due to loss of advertising effectiveness on one’s own 
market, but the possibility of simultaneous stealing of 
market shares.  With the above equations, the model portrays 
that each competitor will concentrate efforts to increase 
market share it does not control at time t (Bass et al., 
2005).  The effort to defend the market share already 
controlled by each competitor is implicit in the 
coefficients, 1u  and 2u .  
E. IRREGULAR WARFARE ADAPTATION 
The purpose of this thesis is to show that simple 
mathematical models for marketing analysis can be adapted to 
study the complex dynamics of irregular warfare.  It is true 
that the Iraqi insurgency or the NATO battle with the 
Taliban is much more profound than the American market 
battles between Coca-Cola and Pepsi, but business 
competition is not simple either.  The models that can 
provide insight to the latter are highly adaptable to the 
former.  What is required for these models to apply and 
provide valuable insight is principally a change in lexicon.  
We now examine the terms of the Vidale-Wolfe model of 
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III. THE MODEL 
Mathematics, as the language of science, allows 
interplay between empirical and theoretical 
research 
Steven Shugan  
 In Chapter III, we define our model and explain in 
detail the parameters.  We utilize counterinsurgency 
doctrine from FM 3-24 to explain our concept of the “market” 
in counterinsurgency and explore the terms that influence 
it.   
A. A LANCHESTRIAN MARKETING MODEL OF IRREGULAR WARFARE 
Our model considers the case of Irregular Warfare 
utilizing equations of the expanded Vidale-Wolfe model in 
case of two competitors.  For the discussion to follow, the 
competitors are referred to as the Host Nation and the 
Insurgency.  The identification of these two competitors is 
made in light of a situation, such as that currently being 
in experienced in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and 
Colombia where U.S. forces are engaged in Irregular Warfare 
campaigns in cooperation with a host nation against a non 




( ) ( ) ( )(1 ( )) ( )( ( ))dm t t t m t t m t
dt
α β λ= − −  
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2 2
( ) ( )(1 ( )) ( ) ( )( ( ))dm t t m t t t m t
dt





 1 2( ) ( ) 1m t m t+ = , The total population is comprised 
of a pro-government population and a pro-insurgent 
population;  
0 1α≤ ≤ , The assessed value of the 
counterinsurgent effort being waged by the 
government and any assisting government; 
0 1β≤ ≤ , The assessed value of the government’s 
ability to provide basic services and conditions 
of good governance; 
Units of αβ  is population transferred per unit 
time.  
0 1λ≤ ≤ , The assessed value of the insurgency 
being waged against the government; 
Units of 2λ  ispopulation transferred per unit 
time.  
   
 Utilizing the Lanchestrian model representation 
depicted in Figure 4, we can represent the Lanchestrian 
Based Marketing Model with in a similar way.  
 
 
Figure 6.   Lanchestrian Based Marketing Model of IW 
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1. Market Share m(t) 
 Since Irregular Warfare is a struggle over a relevant 
population, both the Host Nation and Insurgency control 
portions of the “market,” but one must take care to define 
the market thoughtfully and clearly in applying our modeling 
methodology.  Control in this case is not a function of the 
overall “sales,” but rather the portion of the relevant 
population that identifies with, supports, or acquiesces to 
the given competitor.  
A complex and diverse population in an insurgent 
environment can be defined in many ways, but for clarity 
here we define a market in one of two ways.  First, and most 
obvious, we can define the market to represent the entire 
population of the region of concern.  This is a relatively 
large market, taking into account men, women, and children.   
The passive majority may or may not have great 
conviction one way or another regarding the government’s 
battle with the insurgency.  The focus of this general 
population, the grey colored population in Figure 7, is to 
live in a safe environment, with the essentials of life not 
in jeopardy. With this sense of the market, the resulting 
market share reflected in the model corresponds to the 





Figure 7.   From FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Population 
Depiction 
The second way of defining a market for the purposes of 
the model is to look at a population in a particular region 
and seek to represent only the subset of that population 
that can realistically impact the conflict.  In Figure 7, 
this would be depicted by the white and black populations.  
This market would represent potential active insurgents or 
direct supporters.  Representing this sense of the market 
allows the model to produce a sense of the actual end 
strength of the insurgency.  Later we explore both 
parametric and data driven results utilizing both notions of 
these population markets. 
2. Counterinsurgent Effort α 
The α term is a number between 0 and 1 that runs in 
parallel to the ρ  term in the Vidale–Wolfe model.  The 
level of advertising that ρ  represented in Vidale-Wolfe is, 
in our model, a parameter that captures the level of 
counter-insurgent effort.  In the advertising world, the ρ  
value of Coca-Cola would be assessed to be high relative to 
Shasta Brand cola, as Coca-Cola advertises more than Shasta. 
The analogous comparison in our model is the large scale  
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counter-insurgency effort in Iraq or Afghanistan vice that 
currently taking place in the Philippines, where relatively 
few forces are engaged in action.    
3.  Governmental Effectiveness β 
In Vidale-Wolfe, m(t) is a value corresponding to the 
response to marketing for a given firm engaged in 
advertising.  This term is a representation of the 
attractiveness of a certain product to a population of 
potential consumers.  In the realm of Irregular Warfare, the 
product being offered is a life controlled either by the 
host nation or the Insurgents.  β is a 0 to 1 bounded value 
that represents the quality of life for an individual should 
they choose to support the host nation.  β is a measure of 
effectiveness of the host nation’s ability to provide 
services, security, and stability.  A key point to remember 
is that this is a value that must represent these factors 
from the point of view of an individual living in the 
relevant population, not an outside or independent 
assessment.  
4.  Insurgency Intensity λ  
The value λ  represents the intensity, also bounded 
between 0 and 1, of the insurgency.  This intensity can 
relate to the number or insurgents fighting, the amount of 
territory or population they control or operate in, or the 
degree in which they have influence within the established 
community structure. This effectiveness term is a measure of 
how persuasive the Insurgents are in their effort to control 
the population.  The sense of this term is less well defined 
than that of β, but intuitively simple to discern.  Lambda 
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can be estimated by the degree with which the Insurgency 
provides protection or services, such as is the case with a 
group such as Hezbollah. Lambda can also be derived from the 
brutality of an Insurgency.  Methods such as kidnapping, 
murder, suicide bombing are all very persuasive when trying 
to control a relevant population and would correspond to 
high β values.  One observation seen through history is that 
overly brutal tactics can have little or zero effectiveness 
in controlling a population when they see no way of avoiding 
that violence. 
5. Importance of Subject Matter Experts 
As was the case with Lanchester’s Equations of Modern 
and Ancient Combat, the quality a of subject matter expert’s 
opinion as an input value in the model is of fundamental 
importance in our model.  This is always the case with 
insurgency analysis, but there are fewer inputs and 
therefore less margin for critical error.  More complicated 
models than this one merely compound the need for judgment 
and possibilities for error.  Each of our terms, like the 
individual attrition terms of Lanchester’s Equations, is a 
composite quantitative representation, a collective sense of 
a specific situation.  Our model serves as a framework for 
Social Scientists to provide a few critical inputs that 
capture the essence of each term.  Well-founded parameters 
can then successfully model a given situation, so as to 
better forecast population dynamics, reassess strategy, or 
gain insight into enemy actions observed.  This rather 
general description of the importance of subject matter 
experts is illustrated with abstract examples in later 
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chapters.  We show how expert knowledge and opinion from an 
actual historical irregular war can be applied.   
The model is a gross simplification of what is going on 
during a conflict, of course, but “models that explain all 
observations often predict poorly. . . stronger 
approximating assumptions allow cleaner predictions.” 
(Shugan, 2002,)  The model, and its simple framework, is a 
success, if it provides insight into what is happening with 
the most crucial entity in Irregular Warfare, the 
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IV. MODEL SOLUTION AND ANALYSIS 
A. MODEL SOLUTION 
We begin the description of the model solution with our 
original equation, solving here only for the pro-government 
(counterinsurgent) population:  
21
1 1
( ) (1 ( )) ( )dm t m t m t
dt
αβ λ= − −  
2
1( ) ( )m tαβ αβ λ= − +  




( ) ( ) ( )dm t m t
dt
αβ λ αβ+ + =  
We next multiply both sides by an arbitrary function f(t).  
21
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )dm t f t m t f t f t
dt
αβ λ αβ+ + =  
 
Next, solving for a specific function f(t) such that:  
21
1 1
( )( ( ) ( )) ' ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )dm tm t f t f t m t f t f t
dt
αβ λ αβ= + + =  
This requires solving the easier differential equation.  
     2( ) ( )
df f t
dt
αβ λ= +  
Whose solution is: 
2( )( ) tf t e αβ λ+=  
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Allowing us to now solve for: 
22 ( )( )
1( ( ) ) '
ttm t e e
αβ λαβ λ αβ ++ =  
Integrating both sides yields: 
22 ( )( )
1 2( )
ttm t e e C
αβ λαβ λ αβ
αβ λ
++ = ++  








− += ++  
Where C is set to satisfy the initial condition 
1 2(0)C m
αβ
αβ λ= − +  
The final answer is: 
2 2( ) ( )
1 1 2( ) (0) (1 )
t t
m t m e e
αβ λ αβ λ αβ
αβ λ
− + − += + − +  
Therefore, in the steady state the fraction of population 
that is pro-government (the counterinsurgents) is equal to: 
2
αβ
αβ λ+  
B. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL 
 Modeling counterinsurgency within the construct of a 
competitive marketing environment provides an easily 
understood and interpreted mental construct for the 
underlying complexities in an irregular warfare environment.  
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The parameters within the model represent, and in themselves 
encompass, a vast amount of observed, researched, or subject 
expert input.  However complicated the input process, the 
resulting output is straightforward and highly insightful.  
A junior officer, or the Commanding General, can both 
understand what the model describes, consistent with 
existing U.S. Army Doctrine.   
 
 
Figure 8.   From FM 3-24 Lines of Operation in IW 
Figure 8 from FM 3-24 depicts the logical lines of 
operation for a counterinsurgency. These lines are the means 
with which the relevant population is believed to be 
influenced into moving from one sub-population to another.  
Our model closely adheres to these lines of operation, with 
the parameters α  and β corresponding directly.    
The marketing based model of counterinsurgency also 
reinforces intuitive beliefs on the environment and tenets 
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espoused in FM 3-24.  First, we consider a small group of 
insurgents, representing a very small portion of a 
particular population, who are conducting violent acts 
against local government forces and population centers.  
Historical knowledge, intuition, and doctrine all assert 
that despite the small size of the insurgency relative to 
the population and government forces, the mere existence of 
such a force will result in increased problems within the 
region in question.   
A small number of highly motivated insurgents 
with simple weapons, good operations security, 
and even limited mobility can undermine security 
over a large area. Thus, successful COIN 
operations often require a high ratio of security 
forces to the protected population.   (FM 3-24, 
pp. 1-2) 
1. First Model Application 
We now apply the model to show how it describes this 
situation quantitatively.  We examine a hypothetical case in 
which the government of a particular nation is relatively 
weak in the judgment of experts who assess various factors 
in a predefined rubric. The relative weakness of the 
government results in its inability to identify, monitor, 
apprehend, and prosecute members of an emerging insurgent 
group.  Consistent with the ineffectiveness of security 
efforts, the government only provides meager support in the 
way of social services, good governance, and economic 
vitality to the local populous of 200,000—in which are 3,000 
insurgents. 
We approximate the differential equation in the full 
model with a difference equation: 
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2( ) ( (1 ( )) ( ( )))m t m t m tδ αβ λΔ = − −  
 
where m(t) is the portion of the total population 
identified as pro-government. We have assigned the model 
parameters (α , β , and λ ) to reflect the sense of the 
situation as follows: 
 
α  = .4 Level of counter-insurgent effort 
β  = .4 HN services, security, and stability 
λ    = .6 Insurgent level of effort 
δ     = .1 Time step 
 
Utilizing these parameters and an initial number of 
3,000 insurgents, the resulting growth of the insurgency is 
seen in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9.   Insurgent Support over time (Case 1) 
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Figure 9 demonstrates that the insurgency quickly will 
capture a larger portion of the population and grow at a 
steady rate as the initially small numbers are able to act 
on and attract members from the larger vulnerable 
population.  On the other hand, the government is battling 
the insurgency with weak counterinsurgent efforts and 
offering the population no reason to identify or support its 
efforts.  In a marketing sense, the government is losing 
market share because of a weak advertising strategy 
(counterinsurgent effort) and a poor product (social 
services/economy). 
Utilizing the steady-state equation from the complete 
solution to the differential equation, the long run steady 
state of the pro-government population, given the 




αβ λ+  
(.4*.4)/(.4*.4 + .6*.6) = .3077 
 
Left unchecked, the pro-insurgent population will grow to 
almost 70% of the total population, numbering 140,000.  The 
difference equation demonstrates the accuracy of the steady 
state equation as shown in Figure 10.   
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Figure 10.   Insurgent Support over time (Long-Run) 
As the victim nation and possibly outside supporters 
recognize the growth in the threatening insurgency, efforts 
are made along the logical lines of operation depicted in 
Figure 7.  The government’s level of effort, available 
resources, and counterinsurgency campaign will not remain 
constant over time.  Active and violent engagement of 
insurgent forces will take place, resources aimed at nation 
building and increasing military capacity will be poured 
into the area, and an increase in the level of host nation 
troops or outside support troops occurs. The values of the 
parameters in the model change to reflect the new policy and 
strategy. The engagement of insurgent fighters will increase 
the counterinsurgent effort α while also having the 
simultaneous benefit of decreasing the insurgency effort λ.  
The increased resources committed to social service and the 
economic outlook for the population will have a positive 
impact on the β parameter.  The resulting changes in the 
vignette are listed below. 
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α   = .6 Level of counter-insurgent effort 
β  = .6 HN services, security, and stability 
λ    = .25 Insurgent level of effort 
δ     = .1 Time step 
  
Despite the drastic increase in the host nations’ 
parameters reflecting troop increases and resource 
allocation, and the assault on the ability of the 
insurgency to have an effective effort, the insurgency 
still is not beaten or even drastically cut in numbers.  
The insurgency is barely contained and will persist, as 
shown in Figure 11, in the painfully slow decline with the 
given parameters.   
 
 
Figure 11.   Insurgent Support over time (Case 2) 
Despite the slow progress made by the government, 
utilizing the steady state equation from the complete 
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solution to the differential equation, the long run steady 




αβ λ+  
(.6*.6)/(.6*.6 + .25*.25) = .852 
 
The long-run steady-state equation demonstrates that the 
pro-government population eventually reaches 85% of the 
total population.  But, it takes a long time to reach 
equilibrium. 
In this finding, demonstrated by a purely hypothetical 
situation, the model explains the well known motivation 
behind insurgencies throughout history. Close examination 
shows it to be a general property of the equations, as well 
as insurgencies in general. The timeframe for defeating the 
insurgency is long, even if the parameters in the above 
scenario are sustainable for the government engaged in 
battling the insurgency.  Nowhere is this more evident than 
in the current situation the Afghani government and the 
United States find themselves in fighting the Taliban.  
Despite an enormous effort by the United States, the 
relatively small insurgency persists in influencing large 
portions of the populous with no end in sight.  
C. REAL WORLD APPLICATION OF THE MODEL 
Application of the Lanchestrian Based Marketing Model 
of Irregular Warfare to a hypothetical situation with 
notional values for the parameters yields interesting and 
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insightful results.  However, for the model to have greater 
credibility, real-world data needs to be applied and 
analyzed in the context of the equations.  As with any 
model that depends on parameters that reflect an 
aggregation of subject matter expert’s opinions, there is 
great difficulty in data collection.  Fortunately, we are 
able to employ a study commissioned by USMCCDC OAD to 
explore our Model of Irregular Warfare with real-world 
data.   
In December 2007, the Virginia Modeling, Analysis, and 
Simulation Center (VMASC) conducted a study entitled, 
“Continued Population Dynamics Investigative Research to 
Support Marine Corps Studies System Irregular Warfare 
Study.”  The purpose of the study was to develop a set of 
indices that could be used as input into the system dynamic 
model seen in Figure 3, which could then be used to assess 
the impact of policy changes.  The study focuses on the 
nation of Colombia, and its long struggles with insurgency.  
In order to study Colombia in the context of the VMASC 
system dynamic model, the authors defined five indices and a 
scoring system that would provide numerical inputs into 
their model.  The indices they define are the Polity Index, 
the Human Rights Index, the Social Capacity Index, the 
Counterinsurgency Index, and the Insurgency Index.  Each of 
the indices is assessed by subject matter experts who score 
supporting factors on a scale of 1 to 5 and detracting 
factors on a scale of -1 to -5.   
For the VMSAC study, the experts scored Colombia’s 
indices over two time periods, 1993-2001 and 2001-2006.  
Table 1 is an example of the index rubric VMASC developed. 
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Supporting Factors 1993-2001 2001-2006 
Military: 40k troops, 55k 
soldiers, combined mil 125k 
with proposed increase to 
225k 
4 5 
COIN coupled with War on 
Terrorism 
4 5 
Rules of engagement 
unrestricted   
4 5 
Citizens support War on Terror 
approach  
4 5 
External funding 4 5 
Military—not fully capable, but 
made a clear come-back
  
3 4 
National Police has evolving 
role 
3 4 










independent of C-i-C and 





National Police corruption 
level low   
2 3 
Stasis  2 2 
Spoilers  2 2 
Societal based add semblance 
of democracy  
1 2 
Supporting Factors Totals 42.5 52.5 
Detractions   
Anyone having contacts with 
guerrillas are legitimate 
military targets 
-5 -5 
Military has conflictual 
relationship with rural 
communities 
-4 -4 
Counterinsurgency seen as 
privatized  
-3 -1 
Military corruption level high
  
-3 -3 
Military human rights abuses -3 -2 
No real defensive strategy -3 -2 
Spillover of violence into 
neighboring countries  
-3 -3 
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Para militaries treated like 
felons, tapping resources of 
National Police  
-2 -2 
Military unclear of intent of 
insurgents 
-2 -2 
War fatigue -2 -1 




Detraction Total -32 -27 
Factor Total 10.5 24.5 
 
Table 1.   Counterinsurgency Index Scoring Table (From VMASC) 
 We apply the input of these experts by first mapping 
the indices into the parameters of our Lanchestrian Based 
Marketing Model of Irregular Warfare.   
 
α  =  Counterinsurgency Index  
β  =  Polity Index, Human Rights Index, Social  
  Capacity Index 
λ    =  Insurgency Index  
 
We then normalize the indices on a 0 to 1 scale so 
indices are able to be utilized within our Model of 
Irregular Warfare.   
 For the period of 1994–2000 assuming a vulnerable 
population of just under 85,000 in the Lanchestrian Based 
Marketing Model of Irregular Warfare, we again approximate 
the differential equation in the full model with a 





α  = .4856 Level of counter-insurgent effort 
β  = .4284 HN services, security, and stability 
λ    = .5855 Insurgent level of effort 
δ     = 1/7 = .1429, (1/years assessed) time step 
 
 
Figure 12.   Predicted Colombian Insurgency (1994-2000) 
Figure 13 demonstrates that the prediction produced by 
the Lanchestrian Based Marketing Model of Irregular Warfare 
appears to fit the insurgency strength trend when compared 
to the actual data on Colombian insurgency strength for the 
same time period utilized within the VMASC study that had 




Figure 13.   Predicted Versus Actual Insurgency Strength 
Similar to the situation in the hypothetical vignette 
previously discussed, the level of effort, available 
resources and counterinsurgency efforts do not remain 
constant over time.  Policy and strategy of the government 
change to better address the observed growing threat.  For 
Colombia, that threat was 34,000 insurgents in 2001.   
The U.S. attacks of September 11 paved the way 
for Colombia’s President Uribe to introduce his 
state-based, hard line approach to insurgency.  
U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft supported the 
position that drug trafficking and terrorism are 
the same.  This now meant that the counter 
insurgency once accepted as the war on drugs 
would be a part of the war against terrorism. 
(Sokolowski et al., 2007) 
Reflecting on the change in policy and strategy, 
subject matter experts evaluated the changes of each of the 
indices for the years of 2001-2006.  We again apply our 
Model of Irregular Warfare and examine the resulting  
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trajectory of the counterinsurgency campaign in Figure 14. 
The index changes are reflected with the parameters for the 
model as follows: 
 
α  = .6202 Level of counter-insurgent effort 
β   = .5359 HN services, security, and stability 
λ    = .4807 Insurgent level of effort 
δ     =  1/6 = .1667, (1/years assessed) Time step 
 
 
Figure 14.   Predicted Colombian Insurgency 
 The prediction produced by the Lanchestrian Based 
Marketing Model of Irregular Warfare suggests that the 
battle between the government and the insurgency reaches a 
virtual stalemate, with the number of insurgents remaining 
relatively constant over the next six years.   
Looking at the anticipated level of insurgency with the 
actual levels in Figure 15 shows some difference between the 
values, but the trend over the total time period is not 
increasing drastically.   
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Figure 15.   Colombian Insurgency (2001-2006) 
The large difference between the predicted level of 
insurgency with the actual level that occurs after 2005 is 
likely the result of the more than doubling in size of the 
Colombian military by that time.  Since the subject matter 
experts’ scoring of the indices must be applied over the 
total time period, such a change is not reflected in the 
model and differences in the out years are expected.  
Despite variation in the predicted and actual strength 
of the Colombian insurgency, when seen over the course of 
1994–2006 time period in Figure 16, the Lanchestrian Based 
Marketing Model of Irregular Warfare offers insight with a 
























































This thesis explores the applicability of a 
Lanchestrian Marketing Model to gain insight into an 
Irregular Warfare counterinsurgency environment.  The 
insight provided is focused on the popular support for a 
government battling an insurgency, possibly with the support 
or presence of U.S. forces, or a rebellious group waging 
one.  The measure of effectiveness in the model is not 
casualties taken by either side, but rather the trajectory 
of the population’s sentiment or opinion toward the 
insurgent groups.  Gaining insight into that sentiment 
allows for assessment of how well the counterinsurgent fight 
is going, because it is from the population where 
intelligence and ultimately victory are derived. 
Rather than attempting to model individual agents or 
the plethora of cause and effect relationships involved with 
specific social interactions, our model exploits the simple 
elegance at the heart of Lanchester’s equations.  In Chapter 
II, we explored the class of marketing community models 
derived from Lanchester’s work.  In Chapter III, we then 
describe parallels in the world of Irregular Warfare.  We 
successfully outline parameters that capture the sense of a 
counterinsurgency environment and provide a framework in 
which subject matter experts can quantify inputs into a 
model that is easily understood and interpreted.  We solved 
the resulting differential equations, yielding a steady- 
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state equation that provides immediate insight into the 
course of a population’s support for the government or the 
insurgency. 
In Chapter IV, we demonstrated parametric results that 
reinforce known characteristics of insurgency struggles.  We 
next utilized data from a USMC sanctioned study to test our 
model with an existing data set.  The results demonstrated 
that our model accurately reflects the movement of support 
within a population toward or away from a government or 
insurgency.  
Perhaps most importantly, our model has demonstrated an 
ability to focus debate on what is otherwise an ambiguous 
warfare area for analysts to study.  By adapting the input 
of subject matter experts within the framework of our model, 
with a small set of parameters that represent an enormous 
amount of information, interaction, and historical 
perspective, our model enables easy appreciation and 
recognition of the impact of policy changes.   
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The simple nature of our model generally makes 
verification unneeded; however, validation with data from 
new and varied sources is necessary to further the 
credibility of our model. 
Future research along the lines of this thesis should 
seek to identify and utilize data from the current 
counterinsurgency conflict facing the Afghani and NATO 
governments in Afghanistan.  The circumstances that exist in 
that conflict are well suited to further test the 
applicability of our model.  Another situation that would 
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seem to provide suitable data to test our model would be the 
effort of the Philippine government to combat insurgents on 
the island of Mindanao.    
Other opportunities for future research in the 
applicability of Marketing Models to provide insight into a 
counterinsurgency should attempt to explore a family of 
models that have more than two competitors vying for market 
share. Often in real world counterinsurgency, as in business 
environments, there are more than two sides competing for 
market share.  The circumstance in regions within Iraq 
following the U.S. invasion would seem a suitable data 
source to explore and test the suitability of said models 
for insight into future conflicts. 
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